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Abstract 
 
 Across the country, chronic nuisance laws effectively punish victims of crime for peace 
disturbances.  This Article discusses the enforcement of chronic nuisances against victims of 
domestic violence and looks specifically at a case from St. Louis, in which a victim of domestic 
violence was not only evicted from her home because of the violence inflicted upon her, but 
effectively banished from the municipality she resided in as well.  This Article further discusses 
the history of zoning and nuisance ordinances as tools of discrimination and modern-day 
segregation and the way these laws have been used to deny housing to victims of domestic 
violence.  This Article concludes by discussing and critiquing various state legislation designed 
to address the fair housing rights of victims of domestic violence. 
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I. Introduction 
Housing security is extremely important for victims of domestic violence given the strong 
correlation between abuse and homelessness.  Domestic violence is the third leading cause of 
homelessness in the nation and 92% of homeless women have experienced severe physical or 
sexual abuse in their lifetime.2  In 2016, legal services providers nationwide responded to around 
150 cases of victims of domestic violence who were evicted from their homes because of the 
abuse they suffered.3  Victims of domestic violence often lack adequate emergency shelter 
options – due either to overcrowding or lack of proximity – and as a result victims often return to 
their abusers in order to secure housing.4 
Chronic nuisance ordinances, sometimes called crime-free ordinances, work to punish or 
evict residents for making repeated calls to police within a set period of time, regardless of 
whether the resident was the victim of the activity constituting the nuisance.5  These ordinances 
exist across the country, and many categorize repeated calls to police as peace disturbances.  
When a tenant is a victim of domestic violence, these laws unconscionably force her to choose 
between tolerating the abuse without seeking police protection, or alternatively inviting 
eviction.6  In 2016, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) issued a 
letter of guidance regarding chronic nuisance laws and their impact on victims of domestic 
violence,7 but cities have been slow to respond with changes to existing codes.  While the ACLU 
has settled cases in multiple states regarding chronic nuisance ordinances, this hasn’t led to any 
clear-cut rules or substantive law regarding these ordinances and their discriminatory effect.8 
This Article argues that victims of domestic violence should have a cause of action under 
the Fair Housing Act to challenge chronic nuisance ordinances.  Nuisance ordinances that punish 
residents for calling the police unfairly target survivors of domestic violence, and because the 
majority of survivors are women, these ordinances discriminate against residents on the basis of 
sex. Chronic nuisance ordinances come from a long history of zoning laws that target 
“undesirable” residents to banish them from cities.  Part II of this article discusses this history of 
zoning and ordinance law across the country.  Part III discusses modern chronic nuisance 
ordinances and challenges to these brought under the Fair Housing Act and their connection to 
the history of overt racist zoning practices in this country.  Part IV provides a case example of 
Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing Commission v. City of Maplewood, and the effect of a 
																																								 																				
2 34 U.S.C. § 12471 (2017). 
3 § 12471(4). 
4 § 12471(5), (7). 
5 While what constitutes a nuisance varies from city to city, chronic nuisances are those that occur repeatedly. 
ACLU Women’s Rights Project, Chronic Nuisance and Crime-Free Ordinances: Endangering the Right of 
Domestic Violence Survivors to Seek Police Assistance, AM. C.L. UNION,  
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/nuisance_ordinance_issue_summary_-_final.pdf [hereinafter ACLU, 
Chronic Nuisance]. 
6 See Sandra Park, Victory! Town Will No Longer Treat Domestic Violence Victims as Nuisances, ACLU (Sept. 8, 
2014 4:15 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/victory-town-will-no-longer-treat-domestic-violence-victims-nuisances.  
7 U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., Office of General Counsel Guidance on Application of Fair Housing Act 
Standards to the Enforcement of Local Nuisance and Crime-Free Housing Ordinances Against Victims of Domestic 
Violence, Other Crime Victims, and Others Who Require Police or Emergency Services (Sept. 13, 2016), 
https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/FINALNUISANCEORDGDNCE.PDF.  
8 I Am Not A Nuisance: Local Ordinances Punish Victims of Crime, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/i-am-not-
nuisance-local-ordinances-punish-victims-crime?redirect=notanuisance (last visited Jan. 5, 2020) [hereinafter 
ACLU, I Am Not A Nuisance]. 
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chronic nuisance ordinance on a resident of Maplewood, Missouri who was a victim of domestic 
violence.  Part V discusses the role of the legislature in moving forward and argues that while 
giving victims a cause of action under the Fair Housing Act is desirable, the best way to protect 
victim’s housing rights is to enact blanket legislation that prohibits landlords and municipalities 
from evicting residents because of their status as victims of domestic violence.  Part VI 
concludes this article. 
 
II. History of Zoning Law 
Zoning laws and regulations have been a tool used by the government to control private 
land-use since the early 20th century.9  During the industrial revolution, comprehensive zoning 
became a way for big urban cities to deal with overcrowding and make plans for the cities’ 
growth.10  Starting as early as the end of the civil war where newly freed slaves left the South 
and moved to Northern and border cities, cities and neighborhoods have also used zoning laws 
and land use restrictions to create and further implement racial segregation.11  As African 
American families moved away from the South in search of work and safety, white city officials 
rushed to implement zoning laws to keep white and black families segregated.12  Ordinances that 
disallowed black families from moving into neighborhoods with a majority of white residents, 
and vice versa, were common.13 
The power of zoning laws and communities’ ability to enact and enforce them derives 
mostly from Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty (“Euclid”).14  In Euclid, the Village of Euclid, 
Ohio adopted a comprehensive zoning plan that organized the village into six districts and 
designated what could be built within these districts.15  Ambler Realty (“Ambler”), a real estate 
company, owned sixty-eight acres of land in Euclid that would have been divided into three 
different types of districts under the zoning ordinance.16  Ambler sued the Village of Euclid and 
asked the court for an injunction to prevent the Village from enforcing this ordinance on the 
grounds that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving Ambler of its rights to liberty 
and property without due process of law.17  The Northern District of Ohio agreed with Ambler 
that the ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment, and accordingly struck the ordinance 
down.18  The Northern District held that this was further an unconstitutional taking of private 
property by the government without “just compensation” and was not a “reasonable or legitimate 
																																								 																				
9 PATRICIA SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 1:18 (5th ed. 2018) (“Zoning regulations are drafted and enacted 
by legislative authority, and may be enforced by municipal action.”). 
10 Id. at §§ 1:17, 1:19. 
11 RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED 
AMERICA 39–43 (2017). 
12 Id. at 44.  
13 Id.  
14 Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
15 Id. at 379–80. The districts were divided as follows:  industrial, apartment buildings, two-family houses, single-
family houses, and designated different height and lot area requirements.  The ordinance further designated that 
districts construction like hospitals, water towers, public playgrounds, banks, offices, police stations, restaurants, 
theaters, gas stations, etc., could be built. 
16 Id. at 382.  
17 Id. at 384.  
18 Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 317 (1924). 
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exercise of police power.”19  In its reasoning, the Court explained that while regulating public 
health and safety was a substantial interest of the state, the real purpose of this ordinance was to 
further racial segregation.20  The Court accordingly granted the injunction against the Village of 
Euclid.21 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court reversed the injunction granted by the 
Northern District of Ohio, finding the zoning ordinance a valid and legitimate use of police 
power.22  The Court focused the bulk of its analysis on the constitutionality of residential zoning 
districts generally and analyzed its constitutionality based on whether it was justified “in some 
aspect of the police power, asserted for the public welfare.”23  The Court noted that the majority 
trend among state courts was to grant broad authority to municipalities to enforce residential 
zoning ordinances.24  In keeping with this trend, the Court found that residential zoning 
ordinances like the one at issue are a valid way for municipalities to create safe residential areas 
by reducing traffic and noise, thus creating a “more favorable environment in which to rear 
children.”25  With this, the Court found that restricting construction of apartment buildings was a 
valid way to reach these goals of public safety and peaceful residential areas, since apartment 
buildings bring “necessary accompaniments” of more noise, traffic, and businesses.26  These 
“accompaniments” would become so obnoxious, in fact, that ultimately “the residential character 
of the neighborhood and its desirability as a place of detached residents [would be] utterly 
destroyed.”27  The Court described apartment buildings as “mere parasite[s], constructed in order 
to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the residential 
character of the district.”28  Because the ordinance was a valid mechanism for achieving goals of 
public safety and welfare, the Court found that in “its general scope and dominant features” it 
was a valid exercise of the Village’s authority and therefore constitutional.29 
Euclid was the first zoning law case to reach the Supreme Court and has been incredibly 
influential in the power it gives cities and municipalities to enforce strict comprehensive zoning 
laws.  In light of this deference afforded to municipalities and the Court’s language depicting 
apartment dwellers as “parasites,” many cities began using this to enforce legally discriminatory 
zoning laws to implement implicit racial segregation.  In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,30 Justice 
Stewart poignantly noted that “when racial discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes 
their ability to buy property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery.”31 
 
																																								 																				
19 Id. at 317.  
20 Id. at 313 (“The blighting of property values and the congesting of population, whenever the colored or certain 
foreign races invade a residential section, are so well known as to be within the judicial cognizance.”).  
21 Id. at 317.  
22 Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926). 
23 Id. at 387.  
24 Id. at 390.  
25 Id. at 394. 
26 Id. (finding that these “accompaniments” would “detract[t] from . . . safety and depriv[e] children of the privilege 
of quiet and open spaces for play”). 
27Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394.  
28 Id. at 394. 
29 Id. at 397.  
30 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
31 Id. at 442−43. 
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A. Overt Racist Zoning Laws 
 In Buchanan v. Warley,32 the Supreme Court addressed a Louisville, Kentucky zoning 
ordinance that prevented black people from renting or purchasing property in a neighborhood 
with a majority of white residents.33  The language of the ordinance read:  
An ordinance to prevent conflict and ill-feeling between the white and colored 
races in the city of Louisville, and to preserve the public peace and promote the 
general welfare, by making reasonable provisions requiring, as far as practicable, 
the use of separate blocks or residences, places of abode, and places of assembly 
by white and colored people respectively.34   
The defendant, an African American man, accepted an offer from the plaintiff, a white man, to 
buy a piece of the plaintiff’s land.35  However, because the property purchased was in a 
neighborhood with a majority of white residents, the defendant discovered that, pursuant to the 
zoning ordinance in Louisville at the time, he would not be able to reside on the land and 
therefore did not follow through with the contract.36  The plaintiff then sued for specific 
performance, and also argued that the zoning ordinance conflicted with his Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to “acquire and enjoy property.”37 
 The city of Louisville defended the ordinance as necessary to “promote public peace and 
promote the general welfare,” and explained that property values of white neighborhoods would 
depreciate if black residents moved in.38  The Court recognized that in the past, it has upheld 
state actions that exercise state’s use of police power to further these types of goals.39  The Court, 
however, finding that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to “free use, enjoyment, 
and disposal of a person’s acquisitions,” agreed with the plaintiff that the Louisville ordinance 
conflicted with these rights.40  The Court acknowledged that the purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was to grant equal rights to newly freed slaves after the Civil War – but in reality 
the claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment mainly did not focus on race.41  With this 
understanding, the Court’s main question became whether or not the white plaintiff could be 
denied his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment because the person he wished to sell his land 
to was a person of color.42 
 The Court answered this question in the affirmative, finding that the Louisville ordinance 
deprived the plaintiff of his Fourteenth Amendment rights and therefore was unconstitutional.43  
																																								 																				
32 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
33 Id. at 70. 
34 Id.  
35 Id. at 69.  
36 Id. at 70.  
37 Id. at 72.  
38 Id. at 69, 72; see also Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 365 (1926) (granting cities broad zoning 
power). 
39 Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 70 (“[T]he authority of the state to pass laws in the exercise of the police power, having for 
their object the promotion of the public health, safety and welfare is very broad as has been affirmed in numerous 
and recent decisions of this court.”). 
40 Id. at 74 (emphasis added). 
41 Id. at 76.  
42 Id. at 78.  
43 Id. at 81.  
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The Court differentiated this holding from its prior holdings finding segregation in public spaces 
and schools constitutional by explaining that in those circumstances because it still provides for 
“equal accommodations.”44  The Court further rejected arguments that this ordinance functioned 
in a similar way, and worked to maintain the “purity of the races” and prevent “race conflicts,” 
stating that the ordinance did not function in this way, and was instead in conflict with the “civil 
right of a white man to dispose of his property if he saw fit to do so to a person of color and of a 
colored person to make such disposition to a white person.”45  While this case is often seen as a 
major landmark in the fight against segregation, it is important to note that the opinion is 
centered on the rights of the white landowner in trying to sell his property.46 
 Despite this landmark ruling in Buchanan, cities ignored this holding and continued to 
implement overtly racist practices.47  Cities commonly cited vague interests such as “public 
safety and welfare” as the justification for racist ordinances and zoning laws.48  Landowners 
often entered into private covenants that allowed for overt discrimination as well.49  After the 
passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968 and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Shelley v. Kraemer – 
which held that overtly discriminatory private covenants violated the Fourteenth Amendment – 
cities and individuals moved toward more covert practices in the effort to prevent diversification 
of cities and neighborhoods. 
B. Covert Racist Zoning Laws Post Shelley v. Kraemer and the Fair Housing Act 
While the Fair Housing Act of 1968 was a major milestone in the fight for fair housing, 
discriminatory practices in housing continue to this day, and communities continue to be 
segregated.50  St. Louis provides a good case study to illustrate how the growth of the suburbs, 
caused by “white flight,”51 which many cities experienced throughout the 60s, 70s, and 80s was a 
response to the invalidation of overtly racist zoning and housing practices.  In St. Louis, almost 
170,000 residents left the city for the county and outlying suburbs between 1970 and 1980.52  
White residents fled the inner city and incorporated municipalities in the county – today there are 
eighty-eight municipalities in St. Louis county alone53 – and implemented exclusionary zoning 
ordinances in the effort to prevent black residents from moving in.54 
																																								 																				
44 Id.  
45 Id.  
46 Id. at 75 (“[T]he question now presented makes it pertinent to inquire into the constitutional right of the white man 
to sell his property to a colored man, having in view the legal status of the purchaser and occupant.”). 
47 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 11, at 46; see JAMES A. KUSHNER, APARTHEID IN AMERICA: AN HISTORICAL AND LEGAL 
ANALYSIS OF CONTEMPORARY RACIAL SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1980). 
48 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 11, at 46. 
49 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); see also Rigel Oliveri, Setting the Stage for Ferguson: Housing 
Discrimination and Segregation in St. Louis, 80 MO. L. REV. 1053, 1055–57 (2015). 
50 See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Social Engineering: Notes on the Law and Political Economy of Integration, 40 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1149, 1152–53 (2019). 
51 The phenomenon that when people of color move into a neighborhood, white residents tend to move out and seek 
neighborhoods that are predominantly white.  
52 Oliveri, supra note 49, at 1062. 
53 Municipal Resources, ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI, https://www.stlouisco.com/Your-Government/Public-
Works/Documents/Resources/Municipal.  
54 Oliveri, supra note 49, at 1062.  
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The City of Black Jack is one of these municipalities, and in 1970 it was comprised of 
99% white residents.55  At this time, Black Jack was unincorporated and most of its developed 
land was made up of mostly single-family dwellings.56  In 1969, the Inter Religious Center for 
Urban Affairs (“ICUA”) set out plans to develop a plot of land into two-story townhouses for 
people of low and moderate income.57  After these plans became public knowledge, Black Jack 
residents pushed for incorporation, which was confirmed by the St. Louis City Council on 
August 6, 1970.58  On October 20, 1970, the newly formed City of Black Jack enacted a zoning 
ordinance which prohibited the construction of multiple-family dwellings and grandfathered in 
any existing multi-family dwellings.59  Soon after the ordinance was enacted, the United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) brought charges against the city of 
Black Jack for violating the Fair Housing Act, alleging that the ordinance “operated to” exclude 
low and moderate income residents from the municipality.60   
The Eastern District of Missouri ruled in favor of Black Jack, finding no intent by the 
municipality to discriminate on the basis of race.61  On appeal brought by HUD, the Eighth 
Circuit reversed and, under a disparate impact theory,62 found Black Jack had violated the Fair 
Housing Act.63  While the Eighth Circuit agreed there was no evidence of discriminatory intent 
on the part of Black Jack, the court found that the discriminatory effect of the ordinance was 
sufficient for HUD to raise a prima facie case of discrimination.64  Specifically, the Eighth 
Circuit found the District Court’s ruling to be in error, because it “failed to take into account 
either the ‘ultimate effect’ or the ‘historical context’” of Black Jack’s decision to pass the 
ordinance.65  The Eighth Circuit found the “ultimate effect” of the ordinance to be 
discriminatory, especially “when assessed in light of the fact that segregated housing in the St. 
Louis metropolitan area was in large measure the result of deliberate racial discrimination in the 
housing market.”66  Within this context, the court found the effects of Black Jack’s ordinance 
would be to “foreclose 85 percent of the blacks living in the metropolitan area from obtaining 
housing in Black Jack” which would further “confin[e] blacks to low-income housing in the 
center city.”67  Because the court found this evidence of discriminatory effect of the ordinance to 
be true, it concluded that HUD had raised a prima facie case of discrimination – which could be 
rebutted if Black Jack could prove a compelling governmental interest that was furthered by the 
ordinance.68 
Among the justifications for the ordinance, the City of Black Jack cited “road and traffic 
control,” “prevention of overcrowding of schools,” and “prevention of devaluation of adjacent 
																																								 																				
55 Id.  
56 United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1182 (8th Cir. 1974). 
57 Id.  
58 Id.  
59 Id. 1183.  
60 Id. at 1181.  
61 United States v. City of Black Jack, 372 F. Supp. 319, 329 (E.D. Mo. 1974). 
62 City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1188.  
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 1186.  
65 Id. (quoting Untied Farmworkers of Florida Hous. Project v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 810 (5th Cir. 
1974)).  
66 Id.  
67 Id. 
68 Id.  
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single-family homes.”69  The Eighth Circuit found no “factual basis” that Black Jack’s ordinance 
in any way furthered these interests.70  Because of this, the Eighth Circuit held that the City of 
Black Jack’s ordinance violated the Fair Housing Act by denying “persons housing on the basis 
of race,” and interfering with the “exercise of the right to equal housing opportunity.”71 
In many ways, Black Jack is the classic St. Louis story of white flight.  White residents 
fled the city of St. Louis to surrounding municipalities and did exactly what the residents of 
Black Jack attempted to do with its zoning ordinance.72  Today, St. Louis remains split between 
the county and the city, and the racial divide of the population runs neatly along these lines.  
While Black Jack was an important case for housing rights at the time, cities and municipalities 
across the country continued to find ways to keep unwanted residents out of certain communities 
based on race, ethnicity, and income status.  With the growth of gentrification today, the 
movement of residents has reversed, but the effects remain the same. 
C. Even More Covert: Gentrification and Urban Housing Crises 
Gentrification is classified as the economic transformation of working-class 
neighborhoods that is accompanied by an influx of white residents into neighborhoods 
historically occupied by a majority of residents of color.73  Some scholars have referred to this 
phenomenon as reverse white flight.74  While not exactly a housing practice implemented by a 
city or municipality, gentrification has some of the same effects as the exclusionary zoning 
practices discussed above in that it drives people of color and low-income families out of 
neighborhoods.75  Gentrification is commonplace in most urban areas that attract young people, 
and has led to housing crises in major cities like New York and San Francisco, where affordable 
housing is essentially non-existent.76  When affluent residents who can afford to pay higher 
property taxes and rent move in to communities with lower costs, they drive the housing costs of 
those communities up and force out those residents who cannot keep up with the rising costs.77  
This dynamic has a major racial component:  those moving in are most often white residents and 
those forced out are most often minorities.78 
																																								 																				
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 1187.  
71 Id. at 1188.  
72 See id. at 1186 (quoting Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 355 F. Supp. 1257, 1260 (N.D. Ohio 1973) 
(Black Jack’s ordinance “confirm[s] the inexorable process whereby the St. Louis metropolitan area becomes one 
that ‘has the racial shape of a donut, with the [black residents] in the hole and with mostly [w]hites occupying the 
ring.’”).  
73 David Troutt, Cities, Fair Housing, and Gentrification: A Proposal in Progressive Federalism, 40 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1177, 1178 (2019). 
74 See Hannah Weinstein, Fighting For a Place Called Home: Litigation Strategies for Challenging Gentrification, 
62 UCLA L. REV. 794 (2015). 
75 Troutt, supra note 73, at 1178.  
76 See Kim Barker, Behind New York’s Housing Crisis: Weakened Laws and Fragmented Regulations, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/05/20/nyregion/affordable-housing-nyc.html; Michelle 
Robertson, A Citywide Crisis in Gentrification? New SF Residents Make Far More Money Than Those Leaving, SF 
GATE (April 16, 2018), https://www.sfgate.com/expensive-san-francisco/article/Who-s-moving-to-San-Francisco-
The-rich-the-12805760.php.  
77 Weinstein, supra note 74, at 796.  
78 Id.  
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Scholars have pointed to gentrification as a threat to fair housing in the way that it drives 
low income residents out of neighborhoods they may have occupied for generations.79  While it 
may be the most covert in terms of discriminatory housing practices discussed above, its effects 
are the same on already marginalized communities.  In theory, gentrification can look good for 
cities – it draws in business, drives the tax base up, and can bring much needed attention to areas 
of cities that have long been ignored.  But in reality, the effects of gentrification essentially 
amount to modern day segregation. 
Closely connected with gentrification are chronic nuisance ordinances because cities 
often adopt these types of ordinances in the name of public safety, and can use this as a draw for 
young, affluent residents to gentrify lower income neighborhoods.80  Because chronic nuisance 
ordinances are typically selectively enforced against minority communities, they too work to 
create a similar modern-day segregation. 
 
III. Modern Chronic Nuisance Ordinances 
While states and cities may define what constitutes a nuisance differently, chronic 
nuisances are those nuisances that occur repeatedly but do not themselves constitute crimes.81  
Chronic nuisances are often paired with other anti-crime ordinances, and are sometimes referred 
to as “crime-free” ordinances.82  In Missouri, for example, a nuisance is defined as the 
“unreasonable, unusual, or unnatural use of one’s property so that it substantially impairs the 
right of another to peacefully enjoy his property.”83  Cities and municipalities typically define 
nuisances in municipal codes, and Maplewood, Missouri, for example, identifies twenty-nine 
different types of nuisances in the city’s municipal code.84  In the St. Louis area, 69 of the 88 
municipalities include repeated police calls in their nuisance ordinances.85 
Chronic nuisance ordinances allow cities to punish residents that need what the city 
considers “excessive police service.”86  Proponents of chronic nuisance ordinances see these 
laws as essential to keeping their communities safe and to insure desirable living spaces for 
prospective residents and property owners.87  Stories of victims of crime suffering the brunt end 
of these ordinances are abundant,88 but cities have been slow to change these laws.  The police 
chief of Oak Park, a neighborhood of Chicago, explained that the crime-free ordinance there has 
																																								 																				
79 Troutt, supra note 73, at 1178. Professor Troutt makes the argument that gentrification is a fair housing problem, 
and as such should be afforded remedies under the Fair Housing Act. 
80 Anna Kastner, The Other War at Home; Chronic Nuisance Laws and the Revictimization of Survivors of Domestic 
Violence, 103 CAL. L. REV. 1047, 1066 (2015). 
81 ACLU, Chronic Nuisance, supra note 5.  
82 Id.  
83 Frank v. Envtl. Sanitation Mgmt., 687 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).  
84 MAPLEWOOD, MO., MUNICIPAL CODE § 34-240 (2012). 
85 Kalila Jackson, Dismantling the Divide: Crime-free Nuisance Ordinances are a Public Menace, ST. LOUIS 
AMERICAN (July 18, 2018), http://www.stlamerican.com/news/columnists/guest_columnists/dismantling-the-divide-
crime-free-nuisance-ordinances-are-a-public/article_0e8eef4c-8a8f-11e8-92c8-2f9aa8002b90.html. 
86 Cari Fais, Denying Access to Justice: The Cost of Applying Chronic Nuisance Laws to Domestic Violence, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 1181, 1182 (2008). 
87 John H. Campbell, Solving Chronic Nuisance Problems: A Guide for Neighborhood Leaders, ENTERPRISE FOUND. 
INC. at 2 (2001), https://www.enterprisecommunity.org/download?fid=6702&nid=3548. 
88 Id. at 16.  
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helped to evict tenants for drug-related crimes.89  In his book, Evicted, Matthew Desmond 
challenges a similar Milwaukee crime-free ordinance that was justified as an “effective weapon” 
in prosecuting drug crimes.90  However, of the 1,666 nuisances that received citations in 
Milwaukee, only four percent involved drug-related crimes, while domestic violence was the 
third most common nuisance cited.91  Critics also argue that crime free ordinances like this are 
enforced disproportionately against African American residents and effectively criminalize 
poverty.92  In recent years, these ordinances have also been the center of fair housing litigation. 
A. Housing Discrimination Claims Under the Fair Housing Act 
The Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) prohibits landlords from refusing to sell or rent or to 
“otherwise make unavailable or deny” a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, 
sex, familial status, or national origin.93  The statute also makes it unlawful to discriminate 
against any person based on these protected characteristics in the “terms, conditions, or 
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling.”94  The FHA offers three enforcement mechanisms to 
handle claims:  (1) complaints can be brought to HUD, (2) private actions can be filed in court, 
or (3) suits may be brought by the Justice Department.95 
Most claims brought under the FHA may be brought under two main theories:  disparate 
treatment and disparate impact.96  Courts use a similar framework to analyze claims of 
discrimination in employment and those in housing discrimination.97  For a disparate treatment 
claim, a plaintiff must prove that a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the 
defendant’s decision.98  In cases brought under the FHA, courts evaluate the claims using the 
McDonnell Douglas99 burden-shifting framework, which was originally created for employment 
discrimination cases.100 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green101 was an intentional employment discrimination 
case brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act which reached the Supreme Court.  In its 
opinion, the Court created the burden shifting framework for discrimination claims brought 
under a disparate treatment theory.102  Under this framework, a plaintiff must first plead a prima 
facie case of discrimination.103  Once a plaintiff pleads this prima facie case, raising an inference 
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of discrimination, the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant to articulate a “legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the employees’ rejection” to rebut this inference.104  Because this is 
only a burden of persuasion, the defendant only needs to articulate this reason.105  The burden 
then shifts back to the plaintiff to argue that the defendant’s offered reason is pretext for a 
discriminatory action.106 
In the housing discrimination context, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of 
intentional discrimination by showing:  (1) they are a member of a protected class, (2) they 
sought and were qualified to rent or purchase housing, (3) they were rejected, and (4) the housing 
opportunity remained available to other renters or purchasers.107  Discriminatory intent is not 
required to establish a violation of the FHA.108  Under a disparate impact theory, a plaintiff must 
establish that the practices the plaintiff challenges have a “disproportionately adverse effect on 
minorities and are otherwise unjustified by a legitimate rationale.”109  The purpose of disparate 
impact claims is to punish practices which have discriminatory consequences in addition to those 
that are intentionally discriminatory.110 
Disparate impact claims brought under the FHA similarly get their foundation from those 
in the employment context and Griggs v. Duke Power Co.111  In Texas Dept. of Housing and 
Comm. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, (“Inclusive Communities”), the Supreme Court 
established that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA.112  Under a disparate 
impact theory, a plaintiff must establish that the practice or decision the plaintiff challenges has a 
“disproportionately adverse effect” on a protected class of people and are “otherwise unjustified 
by a legitimate rationale.”113 A plaintiff may prove this disproportionately adverse effect by 
showing a statistical disparity resulting from a facially neutral policy or action taken by the 
defendant.114  In Inclusive Communities, the Court held that a plaintiff must meet a “robust 
causality requirement” in showing the connection between the statistical disparity and the 
defendant’s policy.115  A defendant in a disparate impact case may defend its policy by proving 
that it is necessary to “achieve a valid interest.”116  The Court further noted the importance of 
allowing disparate impact claims under the FHA for specifically challenging zoning laws and 
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other restrictions that “function unfairly to exclude minorities from certain neighborhoods 
without any sufficient justification.”117 
Claims brought under the FHA challenging chronic nuisances have mostly been split 
between disparate treatment and disparate impact claims. 
B. Housing Discrimination and Victims of Domestic Violence 
Bouley v. Young-Sabourin was one of the early cases brought under the FHA by a 
survivor of domestic violence.118  The plaintiff in Bouley was evicted for disturbing the peace 
after her husband attacked her in her apartment and she called the police.119  After this incident, 
the plaintiff’s landlord (defendant) sent the plaintiff a notice of eviction for violating terms of the 
lease, specifically, a provision that stated, “tenant will not use or allow said premises or any part 
thereof to be used for unlawful purposes, in any noisy, boisterous or other manner offensive to 
any other occupant of the building.” 120  The landlord also stated that she and others residing in 
the apartment building were fearful of the “violent behaviors expressed.”121 
The plaintiff claimed that the defendant unlawfully terminated the plaintiff’s lease on the 
basis of sex, and the United States District Court for the District of Vermont allowed the plaintiff 
to proceed with this claim.122  The Court agreed with plaintiff’s argument that her status as a 
victim of domestic violence fell within the protected category of sex.123  The Court further found 
that the plaintiff plead a prima facie case of intentional discrimination because the defendant 
evicted the plaintiff just three days after the plaintiff was attacked by her abuser, and because the 
defendant had no other evidence of problems with the plaintiff as a tenant.124  Accordingly, the 
Court dismissed the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.125 
Since Bouley, a number of courts have allowed plaintiffs to pursue claims under the FHA 
arising from discrimination based on the plaintiff’s status as a victim of domestic violence.126  
Scholars have also made the argument that because women are the majority of survivors of 
domestic violence, discrimination against survivors of domestic violence should therefore equate 
to sex discrimination.127  In Meister v. Kansas City, the plaintiff brought claims under the FHA 
and the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”)128 after she was evicted from her Section 8 
apartment for property damage resulting from an attack by her abuser.129  About two weeks after 
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the plaintiff’s former partner attacked her, breaking windows and ripping blinds, the plaintiff 
received a letter from her landlord that her lease would be terminated early because of this 
property damage, which violated her federal voucher agreement.130  The court found that under 
Bouley, the plaintiff could state a claim of intentional sex discrimination against the landlord 
under the FHA because she was a victim of domestic violence and because the circumstantial 
evidence was sufficient to plead a prima facie case.131  The court denied summary judgment to 
the defendant and allowed the plaintiff to proceed with her claims.132 
The ACLU has settled cases across the country regarding nuisance ordinances that have 
functioned to evict victims of domestic violence for calling the police.133  The ACLU has also 
strongly advocated for legislation to explicitly outlaw ordinances like these, and a few states 
have enacted statutes creating special protections for victims of domestic violence to deter 
housing discrimination.  While Bouley was an important decision for victims of domestic 
violence facing housing discrimination, the protections in place under the FHA for victims of 
domestic violence remain somewhat murky, especially given the power cities and municipalities 
have when enacting nuisance ordinances.  Without substantive or blanket laws on the issue, 
courts still mostly have the discretion to determine whether or not a FHA claim brought by a 
victim of domestic violence constitutes sex or race discrimination. 
 
IV. Case Study: Rosetta Watson and Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing Authority 
v. Maplewood 
Rosetta Watson was a resident of Maplewood, Missouri from September 2011 until she 
was banished from the city in February 2012.134  Watson was repeatedly abused by her former 
boyfriend, Robert Hemmings, and called the police on Hemmings at least four times while living 
at her home in Maplewood.135  In March, 2012, the City of Maplewood held a hearing against 
Watson, concluding that her numerous calls to police due to domestic violence constituted a 
public nuisance pursuant to Maplewood’s municipal code.136  The City revoked Watson’s 
occupancy permit,137 evicted her from her home, and effectively expelled her from Maplewood 
entirely.138 
In March 2012, Rosetta Watson received notice from Maplewood Assistant City Manager 
Anthony Traxler that a hearing was scheduled later that month to determine whether Watson’s 
“situation,” or repeated calls to police, constituted a nuisance.139  The purpose of the hearing was 
to determine if the city of Maplewood should revoke Watson’s occupancy permit, which allowed 
her to live in Maplewood.140  While occupancy permits are typically required of landlords or 
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property managers, Maplewood, along with other St. Louis municipalities, is unique in that any 
person who wants to reside in Maplewood must obtain an occupancy permit issued by the 
director of public works.141  If an occupancy permit is revoked, a resident cannot live anywhere 
in Maplewood.142  The application for a permit is created at the discretion of the public works 
director, and noncompliance with the Maplewood municipal code is grounds for revocation of an 
occupancy permit.143 
At the hearing, Traxler presented evidence of continuing “peace disturbance and/or 
domestic violence resulting in numerous calls to police,” at Watson’s residence, and that these 
occurrences put Maplewood police officers “at risk.”144  Traxler concluded that these incidents 
constituted a public nuisance and decided to revoke Watson’s occupancy permit for six 
months.145  Specifically, Traxler found that Watson violated section 34-240(17)(f) of 
Maplewood’s municipal code, which categorizes as a nuisance “[m]ore than two instances within 
a 180-day period of incidents of peace disturbance or domestic violence resulting in calls [sic] to 
the police.”146 
The ACLU of Missouri filed a federal lawsuit against the City of Maplewood on 
Watson’s behalf, arguing that the City’s nuisance policy as defined in its municipal code was 
unconstitutional.147  Watson and the ACLU settled with the City of Maplewood in September 
2018, and as part of the settlement agreement Maplewood agreed to amend sections 34-240 and 
34-242 of its municipal code.148  The amendment deleted the section of the ordinance that 
defined more than two instances within a 180-day period of domestic violence resulting in calls 
to police as a nuisance.149  The amendment also adds a section to the code that clearly states that 
the City of Maplewood cannot revoke an occupancy permit or otherwise punish a resident if that 
resident was the victim of the “incidents that formed the basis of the nuisance enforcement 
action,” or if that resident called the police.150  This section of the amendment further states that 
with each enforcement action, the City of Maplewood must make a finding as to whether or not 
the resident was a victim of the nuisance.151 
A few months prior to the ACLU’s suit against Maplewood, Metropolitan St. Louis 
Equal Housing and Opportunity Council (“EHOC”), a non-profit fair housing enforcement 
agency in St. Louis, filed a similar suit against Maplewood for this nuisance ordinance, arguing 
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instead that it constituted housing discrimination.152  The same section of the municipal code that 
Maplewood used to evict Rosetta Watson was the subject of EHOC’s case against the City of 
Maplewood.153  EHOC argued that Maplewood enforced this ordinance in a discriminatory 
fashion in violation of the federal FHA154 and the Missouri Human Rights Act.155  Specifically, 
EHOC presented evidence that Maplewood enforced the nuisance ordinance disproportionately 
against victims of domestic violence, African-American residents, and people with disabilities.156 
EHOC delved into the racialized history of zoning law in St. Louis to make its claim that 
Maplewood, which was almost entirely white until the 1970s, intentionally discriminated against 
African-American residents and victims of domestic violence by disproportionately enforcing the 
nuisance ordinance.157  EHOC cited Maplewood’s records on enforcement of the nuisance 
ordinance and found an “alarmingly high” amount of enforcement against victims of domestic 
violence.158  Of the sixteen enforcement hearings held for violation of the nuisance ordinance 
due to domestic disturbances, six of these were enforcement actions against residents who were 
victims of domestic violence – their nuisance being attacks by their abusers.159  In all six of these 
enforcement actions, the residents were African-American women.160  EHOC argued that 
Maplewood enforced this nuisance ordinance in a discriminatory manner to effect its purpose of 
driving African-American residents out in order to maintain the municipality as prominently 
white.161 
EHOC further alleged that because of the unique requirement that residents obtain an 
occupancy permit to buy or rent housing in Maplewood, the disproportionate enforcement of the 
nuisance ordinance not only evicted victims of domestic violence from their homes in a 
discriminatory fashion, but it also effectively banned them from the city altogether.162 
EHOC brought its FHA claims under both disparate treatment and disparate impact 
theories.163  For the disparate treatment claim, EHOC alleged that Maplewood intentionally 
targeted African-American persons and women by enforcing the chronic nuisance ordinance.164  
As circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination, EHOC cited its statistical study which 
found that the nuisance ordinance was enforced against African-American women more 
frequently than white residents and that every victim of domestic violence who was evicted 
pursuant to the ordinance was an African-American woman.165  EHOC also cited to the City of 
Maplewood’s website, which states that, “[o]ver the past decade, Maplewood’s central location 
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and housing values have brought many young professionals and their families to our 
community,” to argue that Maplewood was intentionally driving out African-American residents 
to “lure” more affluent white residents to the city.166 
For the disparate impact claim, EHOC argued that the definition of nuisance in 
Maplewood’s municipal code had a disparate impact on victims of domestic violence and 
African-Americans.167  EHOC claimed that the nuisance ordinances served “no legitimate 
purpose,” and the proposed goals of the nuisance ordinance – safety, public health, etc. – could 
be achieved in a non-discriminatory fashion.168 
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted Maplewood’s Rule 
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss EHOC’s claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted for both the disparate treatment and disparate impact claims.169  The Court held that 
where EHOC could not provide evidence of intentional discrimination aside from “conclusory 
assertions and conjecture” of discrimination, it could not proceed with a disparate treatment 
theory under the FHA.170  Specifically, the Court did not find that EHOC raised sufficient 
evidence of Maplewood’s discriminatory intent to even raise a disparate treatment claim.171  The 
Court rejected EHOC’s statistics as evidence of disproportionate enforcement of the nuisance 
ordinance.172  While the Court noted that at the pleading stage, a plaintiff is not required to prove 
discrimination, it concluded that EHOC failed to produce sufficient evidence to create even an 
inference that Maplewood enforced the nuisance ordinance in a way that resulted in unfavorable 
treatment to residents based on sex, race, or disability.173  Accordingly, the Court determined that 
EHOC failed to state a claim that “nudge[d] its claims across the line from conceivable to 
plausible.”174  
The Court further held that where EHOC could not provide sufficient statistical evidence 
to prove a causal connection between the alleged discriminatory policy and the statistical data 
presented, it could not proceed with a disparate impact theory under the FHA.175  Taking into 
account the protections given to defendants in disparate impact housing discrimination cases set 
out in Inclusive Communities, the Court found that EHOC failed to meet the “robust causality 
requirement” in this case.176  The Court determined that EHOC failed to prove that the nuisance 
ordinance caused the statistical disparity resulting from enforcement of the ordinance.177  The 
Court thus held that EHOC failed to set forth sufficient factual allegations to state a prima facie 
case of disparate impact discrimination and accordingly granted Maplewood’s 12(b)(6) motion 
to dismiss this claim.178 
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Both Rosetta Watson’s claims and EHOC’s claims against the City of Maplewood 
targeted the exact same provision of the City’s municipal code.  While Watson ultimately settled 
her claims with the City, the Eastern District of Missouri did not grant Maplewood’s 12(b)(6) 
motion in that case as it did in EHOC’s case.  While this could be due to a number of factors – 
different judges, Watson’s claims involved an actual person – this difference demonstrates the 
need for more substantive law prohibiting chronic nuisance ordinances, like the one at issue in 
these cases.   
 
V. Future Impact and the Role of Legislature 
This Part argues that the Eastern District of Missouri should have allowed EHOC to 
proceed with its FHA claims against Maplewood.  Chronic nuisance ordinances, like the one in 
Maplewood, violate the FHA because they unlawfully discriminate against victims of domestic 
violence.  Because courts have differed in their interpretations of the FHA and how domestic 
violence victims fall within it, and because the numerous settlements with municipalities across 
the country have not created much substantive law on the issue, this Part concludes with policy 
suggestions for states to adopt and enforce greater protections for victims of domestic violence. 
A. EHOC Should Have Been Able to Proceed With Its Claims Against Maplewood 
EHOC specifically should have been allowed to proceed on its disparate treatment claim 
against Maplewood, and the Court’s decision to grant Maplewood’s 12(b)(6) motion on this 
claim was improper.  EHOC presented statistical evidence showing that Maplewood 
disproportionately enforced the nuisance ordinance against women who were victims of 
domestic violence, as well as against African American residents.179  Under the McDonnell 
Douglas burden shifting framework, this was sufficient circumstantial evidence to raise a prima 
facie case of intentional discrimination.180  The court noted that EHOC’s statistical showing 
presented an “imbalance resulting from enforcement of the ordinance,” and this finding should 
have been enough to at least withstand a 12(b)(6) motion.181 
The Court similarly erred in granting Maplewood’s 12(b)(6) motion for EHOC’s 
disparate impact claim.  While EHOC was required to meet the “robust causality requirement” 
set out in Inclusive Communities, the Court failed to appreciate the complexity of the relationship 
between the zoning ordinance and the statistical disparities EHOC presented.  In Inclusive 
Communities, the Supreme Court noted that disparate impact claims under the FHA allow 
plaintiffs to “counteract unconscious prejudices and disguised animus that escape easy 
classification as disparate treatment” and “prevent segregated housing patterns that might 
otherwise result from covert and illicit stereotyping.”182  While the Court further stated that 
disparate impact theory is meant to remove “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers,” it is 
not intended to displace “valid governmental policies.”183 
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The Court in EHOC essentially conducted no inquiry into the validity of the nuisance 
ordinance, other than stating it was adopted to “promote public health, safety, and welfare.”184  
This is the same standard, boiler plate, essentially meaningless language used to defend zoning 
policy seen in Buchanan.  The Court cited no evidence, however, that the nuisance ordinance in 
fact promoted any of these goals.  In Inclusive Communities, the Supreme Court explained that 
an important step in analyzing a disparate impact claim is to give the defendant the opportunity 
to “state and explain the valid interest served by their policies.”185  In the one sentence that the 
Court dedicates to this analysis in its decision to dismiss the claims, it states vague policy 
interests and fails to explain how the ordinance at issue actually served those interests.186  
Because this inquiry deserved at least a more thorough analysis beyond the pleading stage, the 
Court should have denied Maplewood’s 12(b)(6) motion for the disparate impact claim. 
Although amended pursuant to the settlement agreement with Rosetta Watson, 
Maplewood city officials still retain considerable discretion in decisions to revoke residents’ 
occupancy permits.  While the amendments specifically state that a resident’s occupancy permit 
cannot be revoked if the resident was the victim of the activity that caused the nuisance, 
determination of whether the resident was a victim is left to the same hearing process that was 
used to revoke Rosetta Watson’s occupancy permit.  The amendments also do not specify how 
this will be handled if the victim and perpetrator of the nuisance live together.  
Rosetta Watson’s settlement was approved by the Maplewood City Council in September 
2018.187  While these changes are certainly a win in the fight for secure housing for victims of 
domestic violence, this is just one small battle in a much bigger war.  St. Louis alone is home to 
88 different municipalities, and a majority of them still have crime-free nuisance ordinances on 
their books.188  Considering the strong correlation between domestic violence and homelessness 
discussed above,189 victims of domestic violence deserve better protections and assistance in 
securing safe housing. 
B. Role of Legislature Moving Forward 
While some courts have allowed victims of domestic violence to proceed under FHA 
claims, such judicial action does not guarantee protection from housing discrimination for 
victims across the country.  Further, proceeding under the FHA forces victims of domestic 
violence to shoehorn their claims as either sex or race discrimination – when the real issue is that 
these victims are being punished and effectively re-victimized because of their status as 
victims.190  Various states and cities have implemented laws and ordinances specifically 
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protecting victims of domestic violence from housing discrimination, and these laws should 
serve as guidelines for other states moving forward.  The best way to ensure protections for 
victims of domestic violence is to implement blanket prohibitions like these so that judges are 
not given sole discretion to decide whether victims may bring their claims.   
In Colorado, for example, the legislature has carved out an exception for victims of 
domestic violence in its statute addressing termination of tenancy for substantial violations.191  
The statute states that a landlord has no basis to evict a victim of domestic violence where 
“domestic violence or domestic abuse was the cause of or resulted in the alleged substantial 
violation.”192  The Colorado statute requires documentation of the abuse for the protection to 
apply.193  The statute also makes it unlawful for a landlord to evict a tenant for a substantial 
violation caused by a guest or invitee for which the tenant immediately notified law enforcement 
officials.194  A Minnesota statute similarly prohibits landlords from imposing any penalty against 
a resident for calling the police “in response to domestic abuse or any other conduct.”195  The 
statute goes one step further by prohibiting a landlord from barring or limiting a tenant’s right to 
call for police assistance in an emergency situation.196 
The City of Philadelphia has also enhanced protections for victims of domestic violence 
in its Fair Housing Ordinance.197  This ordinance makes it unlawful for a landlord to terminate a 
tenant’s lease in retaliation for an incident of domestic violence or sexual assault in which the 
tenant was the victim.198  This ordinance also allows victims of domestic violence to terminate a 
lease regardless of whether the term of the lease has expired.199  [This is crucial for victims who 
live with abusive partners and want to leave them without having to worry about paying double 
rent, as well as victims who just wish to change residences to prevent an abusive partner from 
knowing where they live.]  At least nine other jurisdictions across the country have enacted some 
type of protection for victims of domestic violence, or victims of crime overall, from eviction.200  
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 63 
This type of legislation is crucial because it effectively precludes private landlords and 
municipalities from enforcing chronic nuisance ordinances against victims of domestic violence.  
These laws are important in helping victims secure safe housing, and states across the country 
should use existing laws as guidelines for drafting legislation.  Missouri, and St. Louis in 
particular, is plagued by a century of racialized zoning and is now seeing the effects of increased 
gentrification.  As such, the state should seek to adopt similar protections to ensure fair housing 
for all residents.  
While this type of legislation is important, most statutes simply provide a victim of 
domestic violence with a defense against eviction, meaning that judges still have the discretion to 
decide if a victim can remain in her home.201  Further, some of these statutes still fail to take into 
account the complexities of abusive relationships because they do not allow a defense if the 
tenant is a victim of domestic violence who has not already received a restraining or protective 
order, or if the victim allows the abuser back on the premises.202  Oregon, for example, dedicates 
an entire section of its Residential and Landlord statute to protections for victims of domestic 
violence.203  The section prohibits a landlord from evicting or otherwise punishing a tenant 
because that tenant was a victim of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking.204  However, a 
landlord may evict the tenant if the landlord has given the tenant a written warning, and the 
tenant “permits or consents to the perpetrator’s presence on the premises.”205   
This kind of exception fails to consider the difficulty victims experience in dealing with 
an abusive partner.  Domestic violence is a crime of control – victims of domestic violence are 
often under a “coercive control” at the hands of their abusers.206  Abusers can intimidate victims 
and create feelings of fear and dependence on the abuser.207  Those unfamiliar with the complex 
psychological trauma that accompanies physical abuse might wonder why victims repeatedly 
forgive their abusers or let them back into their homes.  However, there is a repetitive cycle of 
violence that is common in many abusive relationships and is defined by a period of tension 
building where the abuser might be irritable or verbally abusive, followed by an “acute 
explosion,” in which the abuser might physically and/or sexually abuse the victim or others close 
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to the victim, followed by a honeymoon period where the abuser might apologize and promise to 
never become violent again.208 
States that have enacted legislation granting protections to victims of domestic violence 
from eviction are moving in the right direction.  However, punishing victims for allowing their 
abusers back in their lives not only undermines these protections, but also contributes to the 
culture of victim-blaming that is so present in our culture today.  At the heart of nuisance 
ordinances that function to punish victims of domestic violence is a victim-blaming culture that 
is deeply ingrained in our society.  Victims of domestic violence are often blamed for their own 
abuse and questioned for not leaving their abusers.  Victims of domestic violence are victims of 
crime, and they should not be punished for crimes committed against them.  Legislators across 
the country must unlearn this deep-seated victim-blaming to better understand the complexities 
of abusive relationships and draft more effective legislation to ensure protections for victims of 
domestic violence.209 
VI. Conclusion 
 
One in four women have been victims of severe physical violence by an intimate partner 
in their lifetime, and on a typical day more than 20,000 phone calls are placed to domestic 
violence hotlines nationwide.210  Leaving an abuser is the most dangerous time for a victim of 
domestic violence and is most often the event that precedes domestic homicide.211  Women are 
substantially more likely to be killed by an intimate partner than men, and in 2010, two out of 
every five murder victims were killed by an intimate partner.212  Chronic nuisance ordinances 
that punish tenants for calling the police effectively force victims to choose between being 
evicted from their homes or suffering domestic abuse, or worse, death at the hands of their 
abuser.  Victims choose not to seek police assistance at times when they are most vulnerable to 
violent abuse or even homicide in an effort to keep their homes.213  Deeply entrenched 
mentalities of victim blaming are at the heart of these chronic nuisance ordinances.  Considering 
the strong correlation between domestic violence and homelessness, the effects of these 
ordinances do not align with the fair housing goals of this country and reflect the history of 
zoning and nuisance ordinances used for discriminatory purposes to keep “undesirables” out of 
communities.  States and cities across the country should push for further legislative action to 
protect victims of domestic violence from these types of nuisance ordinances so that they can 
receive the emergency assistance they need and not be left out on the streets. 
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Moving forward, Missouri and other jurisdictions should adopt legislature similar to the 
statutes described above in Colorado, Minnesota, and Oregon.  Legislators should work closely 
with experts on domestic violence to avoid provisions, like those in Oregon’s statute, that allow 
punishment of victims for allowing their abusers back into their lives.  Victims of domestic 
violence need support from their legislators and communities alike to maintain safe places to 
live.  Fair housing laws that support victims will be an important step in destroying the victim-
blaming mindset that leads cities and neighborhoods to classify victims of domestic violence as 
“undesirables.” 
